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A B S T R A C T   
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in 2002, has been promoted as an interna-
tional anti-corruption tool. Several empirical evaluations on the effectiveness of the EITI scheme provide average 
estimates based on cross-country analysis. However, little empirical work has been conducted on individual case 
studies, especially in the context of Latin America. Our study uses a Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) to 
measure the EITI’s impact on several measures of corruption in the first five Latin American countries to join the 
initiative: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. The method allows us to assess the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the EITI’s effect on perceived corruption at each stage of imple-
mentation. Our results cast doubt on how decisive the scheme has been in combatting corruption. In the vast 
majority of cases, participation in the scheme either had no statistically significant effect or even coincided with 
marginally increased corruption levels (only in very few cases it was associated with temporary minor im-
provements). Taken together, the results indicate that joining EITI did not lead to a substantial decrease of 
corruption in any of the countries under scrutiny.   
1. Introduction 
Charles Darwin famously noted in his travel journal on South 
America that ‘nearly every public officer can be bribed’ (Darwin 1990 
[1839]). Almost two centuries later, corruption is still pervasive in Latin 
America and manifests itself in multiple socio-economic domains, 
ranging from high-profile embezzlement of public funds to petty cor-
ruption by street-level bureaucrats. Sometimes the web of corruption 
extends across multiple countries; the recent Odebrecht scandal exposed 
illegal financing of political campaigns in 12 Latin American countries 
by Oderbrecht (a Brazilian construction giant) in exchange for project 
acquisition (La Vanguardia 2018). The Latinobarómetro public opinion 
surveys (based on responses from 18 Latin American nations) place 
corruption as the third most important problem in the region after 
poverty and crime and in the case of Colombia, Peru and Brazil, cor-
ruption is ranked as the top priority (Corporacion Latinobarómetro 
2018). 
Corruption tends to be especially prevalent in the extractive value 
chain due to the high volume of financial transactions and opportunities 
for enrichment (OECD 2016; IDB 2015). There is much empirical 
research supporting a positive link between mineral dependence and 
incidence of corruption (e.g. Ross 2015). Latin America is the world’s 
leading producer of metals and the second-largest producer of oil; about 
40% of all exports originate in the extractive industries, which also 
represent one of the main sources of public revenue for the mineral-rich 
economies in the region. Because of the coincidence of high levels of 
corruption and large extractive sectors, several development agencies 
and international organizations (e.g. the Inter-American Development 
Bank (2015), the World Bank (2017) and the German Corporation for 
International Cooperation (2016) amongst others) have emphasised the 
need for improving transparency in Latin America’s extractive sector. 
Transparency is embodied in the provision of easily accessible, detailed, 
credible and verifiable information on financial transactions (and the 
broader governance) of the extractive sector, wide dissemination of re-
ports to inform public debate and the active engagement of all major 
stakeholders. 
In recent years, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) has become the international standard to facilitate transparency 
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in mineral-dependent economies. The scheme was launched in the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 
September 2002 with an objective to “promote the open and account-
able management of oil, gas and mineral resources” (EITI 2019). 
Participating countries commit to enhancing transparency in the 
extractive sector through the disclosure of all relevant financial infor-
mation and by setting up multi-stakeholder groups (with representatives 
from government, mining firms and civil society) that oversee imple-
mentation of the standard. Member countries participating in the 
scheme go through different stages. The first stage is one of initial 
commitment (through a government announcement). Secondly, coun-
tries are recognised as candidates once they put together a work plan 
(setting out objectives on how to improve governance in the sector) and 
establish a multi-stakeholder group. Subsequently, once countries fulfil 
a number of criteria (e.g. in reference to public disclosure of financial 
information, publication of EITI reports, public awareness of sectoral 
developments etc), they are then designated as compliant by the EITI 
Board (third stage).1 
Most of the current empirical evaluations on the effectiveness of the 
EITI scheme (in curbing corruption) provide average estimates based on 
cross-country analysis and the evidence is mixed, with some papers 
failing to report statistically-significant impacts (e.g. Corrigan 2017; 
Kasekende et al., 2016), while others pointing to a beneficial effect (e.g. 
Corrigan 2014; Papyrakis et al., 2016). Little empirical work has been 
conducted on individual case studies, especially in the context of Latin 
America (with the exception of Etter 2012 on Peru, which lacks infer-
ential results). Our study uses a Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) to 
measure the EITI’s impact on several measures of corruption in five 
Latin American countries: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and 
Trinidad and Tobago (countries that were the first in the continent to 
join the initiative and are all middle-income economies characterised by 
high levels of corruption and prominent extractive industries). To our 
knowledge, this is the first quantitative evaluation of the scheme for the 
broader Latin American region.2 The adopted methodology allows us to 
generate synthetic control units (i.e. hypothetical counterfactual units), 
for which the time evolution of corruption matches closely the one of 
our Latin American focus countries prior to EITI participation. Any 
observed deviations in corruption patterns (between the synthetic unit 
and the actual Latin American counterpart) in the aftermath of the 
intervention (i.e. participation at the different stages of the EITI) can 
then be attributed to the EITI scheme. Our results cast doubt on how 
beneficial the scheme has been on combatting corruption in the Latin 
American setting. In the vast majority of cases, participation in the 
scheme either had no statistically significant effect or even coincided 
with marginally increased corruption levels (with some exceptions, as in 
the case of Trinidad and Tobago where corruption across public officials 
declined once the country became a candidate member). Overall, the 
results indicate that joining EITI did not cause a substantial decrease of 
corruption in any of the countries under scrutiny. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of 
the EITI as a transparency-enhancing mechanism. Section 3 describes 
our estimation strategy and Section 4 probes into the data used for the 
empirical analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical re-
sults. Section 6 concludes. 
2. A review of the literature on the EITI, corruption and mineral 
resources 
Many theoretical and empirical studies claim that the extractive in-
dustry impedes the development of good institutions in host countries 
(e.g. see Ross 2015, for an overview of key studies on the so-called 
institutional resource curse and Papyrakis and Pellegrini 2019 for 
studies specific to Latin America). The extractive sector provides in-
centives for rent-seeking, where different interest groups strive for ac-
cess to the accrued mineral rents. This rent-seeking behaviour can take 
multiple forms. Politicians may appropriate resource revenues for their 
own benefit, extractive firms may pay bribes to local officials in ex-
change for mineral contracts and the public may demand lump-sum 
transfers and subsidies once extraction commences (Orogun 2010; 
Vokes 2012). Government officials may intentionally redistribute min-
eral rents towards specific interest groups in order to gain electoral 
support (see Robinson and Torvik 2005; Tsui 2011; Vergne 2009). Given 
these multiple vested interests in grabbing parts of the mineral rents, 
governments in mineral rich states often have limited controls in place 
that encourage transparency and limit expropriation (Kolstad and Wiig 
2009). The replacement of tax revenues with mineral rents also reduces 
citizen demand for accountability and provides more room for politi-
cians to engage in corrupt practices (Paler 2013; Williams 2011). In such 
an environment, corruption often becomes endemic and ‘legitimised’, 
often with simultaneous incidences both at petty and grand levels (e.g. 
where both high-ranked politicians and low-level public officials may 
abuse their power in office, see Ansari 2016). Several empirical 
cross-country analyses support a strong positive correlation between 
mineral wealth and the extent of corruption (e.g. see Arezki and 
Brückner 2011; Leite and Weidmann 2002). 
In this context, Vieyra and Masson (2014) find that “resource-rich 
countries with satisfactory standards of governance and corruption 
control, complemented by good corporate governance practices, 
demonstrate better growth, and development results” (Vieyra and 
Masson 2014). However, the problem of the institutional resource curse 
is precisely that resource abundance is, on the average, associated with 
substandard institutional quality (Pellegrini 2011). In this context, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has been promoted 
as a leading anticorruption scheme that can promote transparency and 
accountability in mineral rich nations (Lujala et al., 2017). Both 
policy-makers, as well as the EITI secretariat, emphasise that the 
scheme’s institutional benefits will extend and trickle down to multiple 
sectors (reducing corruption throughout the economy, rather than in the 
extractive sector alone). The broad institutional benefits of the EITI are 
highlighted in several documents and sites of the EITI secretariat: e.g. 
“The results also show that improving extractive governance has posi-
tive spillover effects beyond the management of natural resources” 
(EITI, 2018). The EITI website also makes several references to an 
explicit relationship between the scheme and economy-wide corruption 
indicators, such as the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency 
International (EITI 2017; 2018a). Similar references by policy-makers 
and influential NGOs abound: e.g. “Many of the changes and reforms 
the government is now pushing through are directly attributed to the 
work of NEITI” Zainad Ahmed, Minister of budget and National Plan-
ning, Nigeria (EITI 2018b) and “EITI implementation will ensure 
stronger collaboration between the civil society, government and busi-
ness sector. This collaboration will generate an impulse for greater 
transparency and accountability in the other sectors of Tajikistan 
economy” Zuhra Halimova, Executive Director of the Open Society 
Institute (OSI) in Tajikistan (EITI 2012). 
EITI participating countries are obliged to adhere to financial 
transparency (and audits) in relation to payments and revenues in their 
1 This terminology was used for the longest history of the EITI scheme (i.e. 
until 2017). In 2016, the EITI Secretariat adopted a different scheme of pro-
gression that started being applied in 2018: namely, ‘to be assessed’, ‘inade-
quate progress’, ‘meaningful progress’, and ‘satisfactory progress’ (where ‘to be 
assessed’ corresponded to the earlier stage of ‘commitment’ - while ‘inade-
quate’, ‘meaningful’ and ‘satisfactory progress’ designated the extent of ful-
filling EITI requirements, with the latter category being equivalent to the earlier 
stage of ‘compliance’, see EITI 2016). For our study, we make use of the 
pre-2018 categorisation, given that this fully overlaps with the period of our 
analysis (i.e. 2002 to 2017).  
2 We only focus on the five Latin American countries that joined the scheme 
before 2015; Peru committed to the scheme in 2005, Guatemala and Trinidad 
and Tobago in 2010, Honduras in 2012, and Colombia in 2013 (EITI 2016). 
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extractive sectors. They also need to set-up a multi-stakeholder group, 
which provides civil society and other interested parties (e.g. indigenous 
communities) a platform to voice concerns, oversee implementation and 
hold public officials accountable in case of resource mismanagement 
(Papyrakis et al., 2017). As mentioned earlier, member states pass 
through different stages (from one of initial commitment, to becoming 
official candidates and finally designated as compliant). Compliance 
signifies that multiple criteria related to good governance are simulta-
neously satisfied (i.e. effective functioning of the multi-stakeholder 
group, full disclosure of vital information of the mineral sector, dedi-
cated efforts to raise public awareness of key developments in the sector 
etc). 
Some scholars emphasise, however, that the EITI faces multiple 
limitations in tackling issues of corruption. This is because corruption 
can breed across various stages of the value chain, while the EITI largely 
has a rather limited focus on the transparency of financial flows between 
the government and the extractive firms. For instance, Kolstad and Wiig 
(2009) mention that members of the multi-stakeholder group engaged in 
the validation process can themselves fall in the temptation of 
rent-seeking and patronage. Corrupt practices can also take place during 
the initial stages of procurement and the later stages of public spending 
(of accrued mineral rents, see Papyrakis et al., 2017). The relevant in-
formation is also not always disseminated in an easily accessible format 
or in a language that large segments of the local populations understand 
(Klein 2017). Others suggest that EITI-member states and the private 
sector at times fail to disclose complete and consistent information 
(Gillies and Heuty 2011; Ravat and Ufer 2010) and that the civil society 
is not always fully and actively engaged in the EITI process as part of the 
multi-stakeholder group (Global Witness 2016; Aaronson 2011; Van 
Alstine, 2017; Ogë, 2017). In addition, any corruption-reducing effects 
may be confined within the extractive sector without necessarily insti-
tutional spillovers to the rest of the economy (Lujala et al. (2017). 
There have been several empirical attempts to assess the effective-
ness of the EITI, especially in relation to influencing institutional out-
comes (as well as other economic indicators, see Appendix 1 for an 
overview of such studies). Results tend to be mixed, with some studies 
supporting a beneficial role of the EITI in reducing corruption levels, 
while others finding either a non statistically-significant correlation or 
even a corruption-enhancing effect. The majority of these estimate 
average effects on a large sample of participating countries (while few 
provide individual case studies). One of the earliest cross-sectional 
(multi-country) studies is the one by Corrigan (2014) who finds that 
corruption drops already during the ‘commitment’ phase of the scheme. 
Similarly, the follow-up study by Papyrakis et al. (2017) found that EITI 
participation (especially when countries receive candidature status) 
fully neutralises the institutional natural resource curse (i.e. the ten-
dency of mineral-rich countries to experience increased levels of cor-
ruption over time); they argue that anti-corruption reforms may 
accelerate faster once countries become candidates and strive to be 
recognised as compliant by the EITI Board. Is it a realistic assumption 
however to conjecture that the EITI may influence corruption even at the 
early stages of participation, as suggested by Corrigan (2014) and Pap-
yrakis et al. (2017) (for other studies that also look at disaggregated 
effects per stage of implementation, see Fenton Villar and Papyrakis 
2017; Fenton Villar 2020; Poncian and Kigodi 2018)? Already at this 
very early stage of commitment, governments need to take a series of 
steps (set up a work plan with objectives, establish a multi-stakeholder 
group to enhance transparency etc) in order to receive candidate sta-
tus; only clear evidence of concrete steps towards enhancing trans-
parency at the very onset of participation in the scheme would warranty 
a smooth transition to candidature (and as a matter of fact, several 
countries had to wait very long to become candidates, as in the case of 
Azerbaijan and Ghana where there was a 4-year time gap between the 
expression of commitment and candidature). What is also important to 
note is that the institutional indices used in this type of cross-country 
comparative analysis largely capture perceptions of corruption; in 
other words, even initial signals from public authorities (in the form of 
expression of commitment to the EITI) can influence perceptions on the 
extent of corruption and the direction of its change. As David-Barrett 
and Okamura (2016, p.227) put it, “governments are motivated to 
subscribe to a norm so as to build a reputation … and, in so doing, gain 
access to social and material benefits”. 
Other studies provide limited support to a corruption-reducing 
impact of the scheme. Ogë (2016) uses interrupted time series and 
panel data fixed-effects to find a non-statistically significant effect of 
EITI membership on corruption; likewise, a more recent study by Cor-
rigan (2017) that also includes country fixed effects finds similar results. 
Sovacool et al. (2016) focus on 16 countries that achieved EITI 
compliance and use non-parametric tests to demonstrate that compliant 
countries did not perform better across multiple governance metrics, 
including control of corruption. Kasekende et al. (2016) use a Full In-
formation Maximum Likelihood (FIML) cross-country estimation to 
avoid selection bias and find a small statistically-significant increase in 
corruption in the aftermath of EITI participation; in view of their find-
ings, they advise in favour of performing more case study analyses in the 
future to shed more light into why the scheme may be effective in some 
contexts but not in others. 
Individual case studies allow us to infer more country-specific eval-
uations of the EITI. The study by Fenton Villar and Papyrakis (2017) on 
Zambia uses the synthetic control method (as we do in our analysis) to 
show a statistically-significant drop in corruption at the earlier stages of 
participation (i.e. during the years between commitment to the scheme 
and receiving candidate status). An earlier application of the synthetic 
control method in the context of EITI (for Mali and Peru) can be found in 
Etter (2002), who found a corruption reducing (enhancing) effect for 
Peru (Mali), without though measuring the statistical significance of the 
corresponding estimates. The case studies on Azerbaijan and Liberia by 
Sovacool and Andrews (2015) use a more descriptive time-trend anal-
ysis between 2006 and 2012 confirming a reduction in corruption for 
Azerbaijan, but not Liberia. Last, Hoinathy and Janszky (2017) con-
ducted qualitative research with civil society groups in Chad and found a 
rather limited effect of EITI on corruption (and poverty); they claim that 
civil society representatives largely have their own interests in mind 
rather than those of the broader community. 
3. The synthetic control method 
We have chosen to employ the Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) 
for the purposes of our analysis given its potential to discern and 
quantify causal impacts of specific policies, underscored by its 
increasing popularity in impact evaluation. In recent years, the SCM has 
been extensively applied within several academic fields (economics, 
political science, health policy, environmental sciences, etc) to evaluate 
the impact of specific interventions (or exogenous shocks). In health 
sciences, for example, the method has been applied to evaluate the effect 
of the 1988 California’s Tobacco Control Program on tobacco con-
sumption (Abadie et al., 2010), of the 2008 UK pay-for-performance 
healthcare scheme on hospital mortality (Kreif et al., 2016) and of the 
2004 Los Angeles school nutrition policy (Unified School District’s 
food-and-beverage standards) on students’ body weight (Bauhoff 2014). 
In economics, the SCM has been used, for example, to assess the effect of 
flat tax reforms on economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Adhikari and Alm 2016), of the 2011 international sanctions on Iran on 
the country’s economic performance (Gharehgozli 2017) and of the 
2013 foreign exchange interventions by the Brazilian Central Bank on 
the exchange rate (Chamon et al., 2017). In the domain of political 
science, scholars have relied on the SCM, for instance, to assess how 
Hugo Chavez’s administration influenced several development in-
dicators (Grier and Maynard 2016), examine the impact of PKK’s 
separatist movement on Turkey’s GDP per capita levels (Bilgel and 
Karahasan 2019) and measure the effect of mergers of local German 
governments on different types of public good expenditure (Roesel 
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2017). In environmental studies, recent analyses have probed into the 
effect of the Wuhan Covid-19 lockdown on local air pollution (Cole 
et al., 2020) and of waste pricing schemes across Italian municipalities 
on waste avoidance (Bueno and Valente 2019). 
Earlier methodological approaches (e.g. Difference-in-Difference 
estimations) typically estimated the effect on an outcome variable for 
a treated unit by comparison to a control group of units (i.e. those un-
affected by the intervention, see Abadie et al., 2010; Galiani and Quis-
torff 2016). However, this comparative approach can suffer from 
selection bias due to the subjectivity involved in selecting appropriate 
units of comparison. Instead, the SCM is a data-driven approach that 
generates one or more combinations of possible comparison units that 
best match the unit of interest (prior to the intervention). The compar-
ison units are allocated different weights, producing hence a synthetic 
unit that resembles the behaviour of the focus (treated) unit as closely as 
possible in the pre-intervention period. As a result, the SCM can attribute 
any deviations between the treated and the synthetic units in the 
post-treatment period to the influence of the intervention and perform 
inference through placebo tests (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie 
et al., 2010). For these reasons, other traditional inference techniques 
are less apt at addressing issues of uncertainty about the capacity of the 
control units to replicate the counterfactual outcome trajectory prior to 
the intervention (see Abadie et al., 2010: 493). The synthetic control 
method is also superior to standard panel-data regressions, where co-
efficients often capture correlations rather than the magnitude of causal 
relationships. Even when using instrumental variables, panel-data re-
gressions often suffer from the problem of identifying suitable (and truly 
exogenous) instruments, which is typically done for only a small number 
of endogenous variables. The SCM is a relatively novel method that 
combines elements from the difference-in-differences and matching 
techniques to precisely address concerns on identification and causality 
(which are much more prominent in other econometric techniques). 
This is because SCM explicitly aims to measure the effect of policy in-
terventions by constructing counterfactual synthetic units, with a close 
match between them and the treatment units prior to the intervention, 
as well as controlling for a very large number of confounding variables. 
A question that may arise is whether observed changes in corruption 
can be attributed to participation in the EITI scheme or to some un-
derlying third factors that influence both the decision to join the 
initiative as well as institutional changes (similarly, one may argue that 
the relationship between EITI participation and corruption may be 
bidirectional).3 The synthetic control method (SCM) is constructed 
precisely to address this concern. This is because the SCM controls for a 
wide range of predictor variables when constructing the synthetic 
counterfactual units for each of the case-study countries (i.e. other fac-
tors that potentially influence corruption outcomes over time). In other 
words, the counterfactual synthetic unit is, by construction, meant to 
resemble the actual behaviour of the case-study country before the 
intervention (i.e. before the decision to join the EITI), by having similar 
characteristics (as captured by the vector of predictor variables) with 
only exception being the participation in the EITI scheme.4 
For each of our treated units (i.e. our EITI case-study countries: 
Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago) we have a 
corresponding control-group of (consistently) non-EITI countries 
(known as ‘donors’ or ‘donor pool’ in SCM jargon). We identify a vector 
of common pre-EITI predictors of corruption for the donor pool and EITI 
Latin American states members (based on commonly identified pre-
dictors from other empirical studies). The synthetic unit for each Latin 
American EITI member (e.g. synthetic Colombia, synthetic Guatemala 
etc) is based on an optimal combination of weights that minimise the 
distance (the root mean squared prediction error or RMSPE) between the 
actual corruption values of each EITI participant country and the 
weighted average of its donors’ corruption values (i.e. the corruption 
outcomes of its corresponding synthetic unit). Assuming that pre- 
treatment outcomes are well matched, trajectory differences in corrup-
tion (during post-EITI years) between each Latin American EITI country 
and its synthetic counterpart can be attributed to the intervention (i.e. 
participation in the scheme). 
As a next step, the SCM involves falsification exercises with ‘placebo 
effects’ to examine the statistical significance of the estimated inter-
vention impact (by looking at the distribution of corresponding SCM 
placebo effects for donor pool countries; Galiani and Quistorff 2016: 4). 
In other words, the statistical significance of the intervention effect 
would be low if the placebo effects (for those countries not subject to the 
intervention) are of similar magnitude to the ones of EITI members (the 
p-values can be interpreted as the proportion of non-EITI states with an 
estimated effect as large as that of treated units). Here, we rely on an 
alternative inference method suggested by Abadie et al. (2010) that 
takes into consideration the quality of approximations of the synthetic 
units of the donors and avoids overly conservative p-values. This 
Adjusted Non-Restricted Donor Sample Method (ANRDS) divides the 
post-EITI effect by the corresponding pre-EITI RMSPE and calculates 
adjusted p-values (again based on the share of non-EITI participant 
nations with an effect of a similar magnitude to the one of each Latin 
American EITI member).5 
4. Data 
We study the effect of the EITI on several corruption indicators for 
the 2002–2017 period across five Latin American participant countries 
(Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago). Our 
study period begins in 2002, i.e. the year the EITI was officially 
launched. We focus only on these five Latin American EITI member 
countries that joined the scheme before 2015 (with Peru being the first 
nation to join in 2005); we exclude other Latin-American countries that 
joined more recently (e.g. Argentina, Dominican Republic, Guyana, 
Mexico) since the effects of the scheme on institutional quality might 
take some time to materialise and because of the few data points on 
corruption available after the countries joined the initiative. The EITI 
intervention starts when countries express their commitment to the 
scheme (see Corrigan 2014; Fenton Villar and Papyrakis 2017) and we 
assess the corresponding effects across all three stages (commitment, 
3 The papers by David-Barrett and Okamura (2016) and Lujala (2018) discuss 
how both commitment to the scheme, as well as the pace of progress of 
implementation, may depend on several socio-economic and institutional fac-
tors. Both papers, however, provide only tentative support to the claim that 
high levels of corruption may trigger EITI participation (the coefficient of 
corruption is statistically insignificant in more than half of their estimations, 
suggesting lack of consistency); Papyrakis et al. (2017) also run a series of 
Probit models (regressing the decision to join EITI on the level of corruption in 
the previous period amongst other variables) and find statistically insignificant 
marginal effects. 
4 As a matter of fact, the vector of predictor variables that we control for 
includes almost the same predictor factors incorporated in the analysis by 
David-Barrett and Okamura (2016) and Lujala (2018) (e.g. population levels, 
level of economic development and past growth, mineral rents dependence, 
past levels of corruption, other institutional dimensions, conflict/violence etc).  
5 Alternatively, the statistical significance can be calculated based on a 
restricted donor pool that best matches the treated unit in the pre-treatment 
period (so that their corresponding pre-EITI RMSPE values do not exceed the 
ones of the treatment units by much). The cut-off point is however arbitrarily 
defined and typically the pre-treatment RMSPE of donors can be restricted to be 
anything from twice or twenty times as large (see Fenton Villar and Papyrakis, 
2017 on the associated methodological limitations). 
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candidature, compliance). Table 1 provides the timeline for each of our 
Latin American case studies (and successive progression across the 3 
stages) with the year of commitment demarcating the pre-treatment 
period. 
4.1. Outcome variables - corruption 
We make use of three distinct outcome variables as to evaluate EITI’s 
effect on corruption. The first corruption measurement that we use is the 
‘control of corruption’ index by the World Governance Indicators (WGI 
2019). This measure captures “the perception of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, as well as the capture of the 
state by elites and private interests” (WGI 2019) and takes values be-
tween − 2.5 and 2.5 points with higher values corresponding to lower 
values of corruption. Here, we have reversed the scale (by multiplying 
by − 1) so that higher values, more intuitively, correspond to a higher 
incidence of corruption. The second corruption index relates to the 
extent of ‘public sector corruption’, and captures whether “public sector 
employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or in-
ducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate 
public funds or other state resources for personal or family use”. The 
third one relates to the higher-scale ‘regime corruption’ and focuses on 
the set of corrupt acts carried out by those occupying political offices. 
Both the public sector and regime corruption indicators come from the 
Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-Dem 2019) and take values between 
0 and 1 (with higher values corresponding to more extensive 
corruption). 
In general, these three metrics will give us three distinctive per-
spectives on corruption. The ‘control of corruption’ index, for instance, 
adopts a broad perspective of corruption across all levels in the public 
sphere (encompassing both petty and grand forms of corruption). On the 
other hand, the ‘public sector corruption’ variable focuses on percep-
tions of corruption at the lower levels of public administration. Last, the 
‘regime corruption’ index captures the extent of grand corruption 
committed by high-ranked officials (in the executive, legislative and 
judicial domains). A correlation table for these corruption indices is 
presented in Appendix 2. 
Unfortunately, there is no sector-specific measure of corruption with 
an explicit focus on the extractive industry. The only proxy measure of 
institutional quality in the extractive sector is the Resource Governance 
Index (RGI) by the Natural Resource Governance Institute, which mea-
sures the quality of governance in the oil, gas and mining sector (based 
on an assessment of several dimensions related to tax practices, infor-
mation disclosure, environmental impacts etc). However, data are only 
available for few countries and years; the absence of continuous time 
series data would, hence, prevent us from carrying out a synthetic 
control analysis using the RGI index. In addition, the RGI index itself 
relies on the same economy-wide broader institutional data that we also 
use in our analysis (e.g. the Control of Corruption index of the WGI 
dataset), as to assess aspects of the ‘enabling environment’ in the ex-
tractives sector. Furthermore, the RGI index (for 2017 where data 
coverage is wider) correlates strongly with the 3 broader institutional 
measures used in our analysis (size of correlation between RGI and the 
Control of Corruption, Regime Corruption and Public Sector Corruption 
measures are equal to 0.71, 0.62 and 0.72 respectively). The use of these 
broader institutional indicators to assess the institutional impacts of 
minerals or of the EITI initiative is also a common practice in the 
empirical literature (e.g. Corrigan 2014; Kasekende et al., 2016). The 
assumption adopted in this type of analysis is that natural resource 
management in mineral-dependent economies can have a trickle-down 
effect that will gradually influence the overall level of corruption. 
We note that, since secrecy is one of the defining features of cor-
ruption, the indexes that we use do not measure corruption proper but 
rather the perception of corruption. Furthermore, there is an extensive 
discussion on the very meaning of corruption and on the specifics of 
different definitions that are employed by different sources to generate 
aggregate indexes of corruption. With this caveats in mind, we also note 
that these indexes have been used extensively in the literature and have 
been found to be good predictors of many indicators of socio-economic 
performance, implying that perception does matter and that definitional 
imprecision and measurement errors are not so serious to impair the 
meaning of the indexes (Williams and Siddique, 2008; Boehm and 
Lambsdorff, 2009; Moisé, 2020; Pellegrini, 2011). 
4.2. Predictor variables 
We rely on a large number of socio-economic predictor variables for 
the different corruption indices (e.g. economic growth, level of GDP per 
capita, unemployment rates, democracy, other institutional variables 
etc) to help us build the corresponding synthetic units (i.e. the coun-
terfactual corruption outcomes for each Latin-American EITI country). 
The list of these predictor variables can be found in Appendix 3 and has 
been compiled based on the empirical literature on the socio-economic 
determinants of corruption (for some key studies on significant cor-
ruption correlates see Ades and Di Telia 1999; Treisman 2000; Jain 
2001; Ali and Isse 2003; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Park 2003; Persson 
et al., 2003; Serra 2006; Shabbir and Anwar 2007; Pellegrini and Ger-
lagh 2008; Ata and Arvas 2011; Elbahnasawy and Revier 2012; Tyburski 
et al., 2020). Similar to other synthetic control studies (Abadie et al., 
2015; Ando 2015; Fenton Villar and Papyrakis 2017) we use the 
pre-intervention outcome variables (i.e. the pre-EITI corruption values) 
as additional predictors; this helps control for unobservable character-
istics (and ensure that any post-EITI differences observed between the 
synthetic and actual units can be attributed to the intervention). 
5. Findings 
5.1. General findings 
We relied on consistently non-EITI participating countries to compile 
the donor pools and counterfactual units for each of our Latin-American 
case studies. Appendix 4 presents the estimated weights per donor 
country, corruption indicator, and Latin American case study (where the 
weighted averages per corruption index produce the corresponding 
synthetic units with the best fit in the pre-intervention period). As to 
evaluate the fit of the counterfactual unit, the SCM allows us to visually 
Table 1 
Stages of EITI implementation per Latin America case study.  






Colombia 2013 2014  
Guatemala 2010 2011 2014 
Honduras 2012 2013  
Peru 2005 2007 2012 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
2010 2011 2015 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information by the EITI secretariat (EITI 
Colombia 2019; EITI Guatemala 2019; EITI Honduras 2019a; EITI Peru 2019; 
EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2019). 
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inspect differences in pre-treatment outcomes for each treated and 
synthetic unit (where small differences would enhance the forecasting 
capacity for each synthetic unit over time in the absence of the inter-
vention). Overall, our results point to a relatively small difference in pre- 
treatment corruption levels (i.e. prior to the EITI commitment stage) 
between the actual and synthetic units (see section 5.2). 
Subsequently, we obtain the ‘in place’ placebo effects to derive the 
statistical significance of the post-intervention difference between the 
treated and synthetic units (i.e. of the outcome gap attributed to the EITI 
intervention). This allows us to derive the statistical significance for the 
gap for each post-treatment year based on the ANRDS inference method. 
For each graph depicting the comparison in corruption outcomes be-
tween the actual and synthetic unit, we also present the corresponding 
p-values signifying the statistical significance of the gap (and hence of 
the EITI intervention). 
Our results are mixed and cast doubt on how beneficial the scheme 
has been on combatting corruption (see summary Table 2). In the vast 
majority of cases, participation in the scheme either had no statistically 
significant effect (out of 42 estimated coefficients, only two are statis-
tically significant at 1% level) or even coincided with marginally 
increased corruption levels (with some exceptions, as in the case of 
Trinidad and Tobago where corruption across public officials declined 
once the country became a candidate member). Regarding the Control of 
Corruption index, there is no statistically significant post-EITI deviation 
between our focus countries and their synthetic counterfactuals with the 
exception of Trinidad and Tobago (where the results suggest a margin-
ally significant higher corruption level for all three EITI stages). In the 
case of regime corruption (i.e. corruption involving high-ranked public 
Table 2 
EITI effect on corruption (overall results).  
Country Dependent variable Stage Year Gap (EITI effect) 
Colombia Control of Corruption Index Commitment 2013 +
Candidate 2014–2017 +
Regime Corruption Index Commitment 2013 +
Candidate 2014–2017 +
Public Sector Corruption Index Commitment 2013 +* 
Candidate 2014–2017 +** 
Guatemala Control of Corruption Index Commitment 2010 – 
Candidate 2011–2013 – 
Compliant 2014–2017 +
Regime Corruption Index Commitment 2010 +
Candidate 2011–2013 +* 
Compliant 2014–2017 +* 
Public Sector Corruption Index Commitment 2010 +
Candidate 2011–2013 – 
Compliant 2014–2017 – 
Honduras Control of Corruption Index Commitment 2012 +
Candidate 2013–2016 +
Compliant 2017 – 
Regime Corruption Index Commitment 2012 – 
Candidate 2013–2016 +
Compliant 2017 +
Public Sector Corruption Index Commitment 2012 +
Candidate 2013–2016 +
Compliant 2017 – 
Peru Control of Corruption Index Commitment 2005–2006 +
Candidate 2007–2011 – 
Compliant 2012–2017 +
Regime Corruption Index Commitment 2005–2011 +
Candidate 2012–2016 +* 
Compliant 2017 -* 
Public Sector Corruption Index Commitment 2005–2011 +
Candidate 2012–2016 +
Compliant 2017 +
Trinidad and Tobago Control of Corruption Index Commitment 2010 +* 
Candidate 2011–2014 +* 
Compliant 2015–2017 +* 
Regime Corruption Index Commitment 2010 +* 
Candidate 2011–2014 +* 
Compliant 2015–2017 -** 
Public Sector Corruption Index Commitment 2010 +* 
Candidate 2011–2014 -** 
Compliant 2015–2017 -** 
** and * correspond to 5 and 10% levels of significance. +/− denotes higher/lower corruption levels with respect to synthetic unit. Source: Authors’ 
calculations. 
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officials), the statistically significant post-EITI gaps generally point to 
higher corruption levels for Guatemala, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago 
during the candidature stage, although corruption becomes lower (in 
relation to the synthetic units) for the later years of compliance for the 
last two countries. Finally, with respect to Public Sector Corruption, the 
only statistically significant effects point to a higher level of corruption 
for Colombia (during the commitment and candidature stages), while 
Trinidad and Tobago experiences higher corruption levels at the initial 
commitment phase and a lower level subsequently (during the candi-
dature and compliance stages). In all cases, the deviation from the 
synthetic units are relatively small. The largest positive and statistically- 
significant gap (pointing to a higher level of corruption) was close to 
0.36 for the Control of Corruption index during the commitment stage 
(in 2014) of Trinidad and Tobago (index range between − 2.5 and 2.5); 
the smallest negative and statistically-significant gap (pointing to a 
lower level of corruption) was close to 0.10 for the Regime Corruption 
index during the compliance stage of Peru (index range between 0 and 
1). These coefficients suggest rather modest impacts, since the corrup-
tion index has a standard deviation of 1. Overall, the coefficients tend to 
be statistically insignificant and are otherwise of modest magnitude, 
suggesting that participation in the EITI does not affect the perception of 
corruption across the country. In the next subsection 5.2, we discuss in 
greater detail the country-specific results for Peru and Trinidad and 
Tobago, while Appendix 5 provides a slightly more condensed discus-
sion on Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras. For every case study, we 
add a subsection on “EITI reporting and transparency” to highlight 
Fig. 1. Control of corruption index of Peru and adjusted P-Values.  
Fig. 2. Regime corruption index of Peru and adjusted P-Values.  
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issues related to EITI implementation per country. These subsections 
largely demonstrate the multiple challenges EITI faces in constraining 
corruption in the extractive industry (let alone, broader corruption 
found elsewhere). We choose to focus on Peru and Trinidad Tobago in 
the main text, because their economies depend the most on the extrac-
tive sector. Furthermore, Peru was the first country in the region to 
participate in the EITI making it a particularly important case to analyse. 
5.2. Country-specific findings 
5.2.1. Peru 
Extractive industries account for around 13% of the Peruvian GDP 
and the country is the second-largest producer of copper, silver, and zinc 
globally (EITI Peru 2019). At the same time, the country has a long 
history of political corruption, epitomised by the 2007 conviction for 
embezzlement of public funds of the former President, and ardent pro-
moter of large-scale extractive projects, Alberto Fujimori and the 
resignation in 2018 of President Pedro Kuczynski after the release of 
videos depicting vote-buying. Peru expressed commitment to the EITI 
scheme in 2005 and received candidate and compliant status in 2007 
and 2012 respectively and was commonly perceived as a pilot scheme in 
the region (EITI Peru 2019). 
Figs. 1–3 depict the values for the Control of Corruption, the Regime 
Corruption and Public Sector Corruption indices. The left panel of each 
Fig. 3. Public sector corruption index of Peru and adjusted P-Values.  
Fig. 4. Control of corruption index of Trinidad and Tobago and adjusted P-Values.  
I. López-Cazar et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx
9
graph displays the actual values for Peru as well as the corresponding 
ones for its synthetic unit; the right panels show the statistical signifi-
cance of the difference between the two lines (i.e. of the effect attributed 
to the EITI). The Control of Corruption and Public Sector Corruption 
indices (Figs. 1 and 3) generally display limited variability. The gap 
between the treated and the synthetic units in the post-EITI period is 
small and statistically insignificant across all EITI stages. These findings 
are in line with Figaredo (2018) who confirms little improvement in 
corruption in recent years despite the EITI implementation and the 
launch of a national anti-corruption plan in 2012. 
Fig. 2 displays values for the Regime Corruption index. In large, the 
actual regime corruption is higher compared to the values of the syn-
thetic unit for most post-EITI years – the effect is significant at the 10% 
level for the largest part of the candidature and commitment periods 
(with the largest positive gap in 2010 being close to 0.1). This also co-
incides with a period of several scandals with high-ranked public offi-
cials in the extractive sector; many of these were related to the state- 
owned oil company Petroperu and became widely known to the public 
through the release of tapes (referred to as the ‘petroaudios’) revealing 
the payments of bribes to favour Norwegian companies for exploration 
activities (De Cuello Blanco 2012). However, the trend became reversed 
in 2015 with regime corruption dropping below the values of the syn-
thetic units in recent years (with a negative gap of a similar magnitude in 
2016 and 2017). 
The failure of the EITI to tackle corruption issues (with active civil 
society participation) can also be related to multiple tensions between 
companies and local communities. Antamina (a local mining firm) 
received a lot of negative criticism around 2012–3 for appropriating 
land illegally, displacing local communities, as well as causing soil and 
water pollution through rupture of some of its pipelines (Quispe et al., 
2018). Oil companies operating in the Peruvian Amazon have been 
producing scores of socio-environmental liabilities affecting indigenous 
and mestizo populations often with the complicity or silence of state 
authorities (Orta-Martínez et al., 2018). Some of the scandals in the 
extractive industry, however, came to light with much delay. The 
Oderbrecht corruption scandal gained much attention in 2016 revealing 
multiple payments of bribes (of about $29 million) from the company to 
Peruvian officials for securing earlier contracts (Faiola 2018); the 
Oderbrecht company engaged into illegal transactions already since 
2005 to secure large infrastructure projects (construction of gas pipe-
lines, hydroelectric power stations) worth about $12 billion (IDL 
Reporteros 2016). 
The more recent modest fall in regime corruption (a gap close to 
− 0.07 between 2015 and 2017 compared to the values of synthetic 
Peru) might reveal some efforts to improve transparency in the sector (e. 
g. EITI Peru 2019). Since 2015, the investigation of corruption cases 
increased by 60%, most of which related to the Oderbrecht scandal; the 
imprisonment of key public officials involved in the scandal sent a strong 
signal that the government was intensifying efforts to tackle grand 
corruption (which possibly influenced public opinion favourably, see 
Gestion 2017). 
5.2.1.1. EITI reporting and transparency. Overall, the EITI documenta-
tion highlights minimal discrepancies between the financial flows re-
ported by mining companies and the government; however, EITI reports 
have also highlighted a number of irregularities over time regarding the 
lack of transparency in the sector. For instance, the initial rate of 
participation of hydrocarbon companies in the EITI was relatively low 
(with participating firms capturing about 70% of production value in 
2007, EITI Peru 2009) and gradually increased to approximately 95% by 
2012 (EITI Peru, 2014). In 2016, the EITI Peruvian team with its 
multi-stakeholder group, expanded the scope of the scheme to include 
transparency in the extractive sector for two local governments (i.e. for 
Piura and Moquegua, where extensive irregularities regarding the con-
cessions of mining projects and intended use of royalties were suspected, 
see EITI Peru 2016a, b). In addition, the 2016 EITI validation report 
(EITI Peru 2016c) was much more critical than previous ones, dis-
approving the earlier omission of several types of flows (such as in-kind 
revenues, infrastructure arrangements and barter, mandatory social 
expenditures, transportation revenues, subnational direct payments 
etc), condemning the absence of any critical reflection by the auditing 
firm regarding the reliability of controls and data produced, and rec-
ommending a closer inspection of Petroperu’s financial transactions and 
transparency practices. EITI reports also generally fail to provide any 
information regarding the revenue management process (of royalties 
accruing to the government), which could strengthen the ability of the 
public to hold the government accountable for its spending priorities 
(EITI Peru 2016c). Although the EITI reports do not highlight cases of 
corruption, they criticise the industry practice of making discretionary 
social contributions to local communities; these are often based on 
rather informal agreements with dubious motivations which undermine 
transparency (EITI Peru 2016c). The 2016 validation report (EITI Peru 
2016c) has also been vocal on the failure of the multi-stakeholder group 
to reflectively endorse and act upon recommendations from earlier EITI 
reports. 
5.2.2. Trinidad and Tobago 
Trinidad and Tobago is a highly mineral-dependent economy, with the 
extractive sector accounting for 32.2% of its GDP and 77% of its exports 
(EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2019). Most of the revenues generated relate to 
the production of oil and liquefied gas. At the same time, corruption is 
rampant. According to the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Report, corruption (in the form of nepotism, police and political abuse of 
power, tax evasion, collection of bribes) is a major hindrance to doing 
business in the country (World Economic Forum 2017). In general, the 
public often expresses mistrust towards the judicial system, the police force 
and senior public officials who are largely seen as prone to engaging in 
corrupt and illegal activities (Sookoo 2017). Trinidad and Tobago expressed 
commitment to the EITI scheme in 2010 and received candidate and 
compliant status in 2011 and 2015 respectively. Compliance was achieved a 
year later than initially expected – delays were related to government efforts 
towards persuading mineral firms to disclose tax data through signed 
agreements (EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2019). 
Figs. 4–6 depict the values for the Control of Corruption, the Regime 
Corruption and Public Sector Corruption indices. Contrary to results in 
other Latin American countries, the EITI intervention appears to have 
had statistically significant effects in almost every EITI stage for the 
three outcome corruption variables. In Fig. 4, one can see that the 
Control of Corruption index has largely fluctuated between 0 and 0.5 
during the last two decades. Corruption values were larger compared to 
the ones of the synthetic unit following the EITI intervention (with a gap 
size close to 0.13 during the commitment stage and 0.21 on average for 
the overall candidate and compliant stages of implementation). In Fig. 5, 
we see a similar pattern for regime corruption following commitment to 
the scheme. During commitment and the first years of candidature 
(2010–2012), the positive deviation in regime corruption between 
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Trinidad and Tobago and its synthetic unit was close to 0.1 units. The 
positive gap decreased in size since 2013 and since 2016 Trinidad and 
Tobago performed better than its counterfactual (with a negative gap 
close to 0.05 – statistical significance at the 5% level). 
On the one hand, it appears that the EITI implementation (especially in 
its earlier stages) failed to tackle corruption. During the same years, cor-
ruption scandals in the extractive industry exemplified failure to reduce 
chronic corruption in the sector (that effectively constrained potential 
benefits from participation in the EITI). Increased oil and gas prices in the 
2000s led to increased (but often wasteful and prone to rent-seeking) gov-
ernment spending. One of the most prominent cases was that of Petrotrin, a 
state-owned company that built a reputation of poor corporate governance, 
corruption and nepotism and finally became bankrupt and shut down in late 
2018. One of its most notorious cases of mismanagement was its joint 
venture with World GTL (a private company specialising in diesel fuels) to 
construct a gas-to-liquids plant; the project (initiated in 2005 and beset by 
multiple delays) cost the government US$399 million (more than twice its 
original budget) and the incomplete plant was finally sold to another pri-
vate company NiQuan Energy in 2012 for only $35 million (Guardian 
2018). In another case, Calder Hart (the former executive chairman of the 
public infrastructure company Urban Development Corporation of Trini-
dad and Tobago) fled to the United States of America in 2010; documents 
linked him with corruption allegations and receipt of bribes for awarding 
contracts (Guardian 2012). The Ministry of Energy acknowledged that 
public officials were previously appropriating extractive rents for own 
benefit and attributed the drop in public revenues from the sector to a ‘tax 
leakage’ rather than changes in production or market conditions (Guyana 
Times 2018). 
On the other hand, Fig. 6 shows that Trinidad and Tobago has 
managed to constrain ‘public sector corruption’ (corruption at the lower 
levels of public administration) since 2013 (i.e. two years after the 
country received a candidate status). The gap has varied between − 0.05 
and − 0.08 units (with a widening in more recent years – statistical 
significance at the 1% level). This modest improvement may be related 
to the intensified efforts by Trinidad and Tobago’s Integrity Committee 
to reduce corruption across the public sector by scrutinising practices of 
public organizations and investigate cases of corruption (with a much 
higher number of cases being reported and investigated since 2009, 
Drayton 2015). In addition, Trinidad and Tobago’s EITI 
multi-stakeholder group have purposively participated in radio and 
television shows since 2013 in order to highlight the anti-corruption 
benefits of the scheme to the wider public and explain in plain terms 
its mandate, procedures and measures (EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2019). 
5.2.2.1. EITI reporting and transparency. While the majority of companies 
in the hydrocarbon industry participate in the EITI process, this has not been 
the case for other mining firms (only in 2016, a pilot with 10 mining firms 
was launched, with only 4 returning the templates with their financial in-
formation, see EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2013a; 2014a, 2016). A recurring 
concern in several EITI reports is the inadequate release of information 
regarding financial flows (with national legislation protecting the right of 
private firms and public entities to refuse access to such information; see 
EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2013a, 2016); both the Ministry of Finance and 
the Economy and the IRD (Inland Revenue Division) have been reluctant in 
releasing financial information (EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2014a, 2015, 
2016, 2018). This has also been the case with state-owned enterprises (for 
example, the National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago Limited (NGC) 
supplies gas to the Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commission without 
any formal contracting in place; EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2013a). The EITI 
reports also repeatedly criticise the lack of audits of the financial accounts of 
subsidiaries of international companies (EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2014a, 
b); in some cases, signature bonuses (one-time license fees) were also settled 
in cash with the corresponding financial flows being unreported by the 
government (EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2014b). On a more positive note, in 
2013, the EITI multi-stakeholder group initiated an awareness campaign on 
the purposes and findings of the EITI process, targeting especially the 
younger generation (EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2013b), while in 2018 a 
user-friendly online portal for communicating data from the sector was 
launched (EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2018). 
6. Conclusions 
Concerns about corruption in mineral-rich countries (and the 
Fig. 5. Regime corruption index of Trinidad and Tobago and adjusted P-Values.  
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development implications thereof) have engendered initiatives that 
promote good governance, transparency and accountability in the 
extractive sector and the broader economy. Within this context, the EITI 
has been promoted as an anti-corruption scheme in the extractive in-
dustry, with country membership increasing fast over time. More 
recently, numerous studies have attempted to investigate the EITI’s 
impact on institutional and economic variables. Most of the current 
empirical evaluations, however, provide average estimates based on 
cross-country analysis. Little empirical research has been conducted on 
individual case studies, especially in the context of Latin America. Our 
study uses a Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) to measure the EITI’s 
impact on several measures of corruption in five Latin American coun-
tries: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
To our knowledge, this is the first quantitative evaluation of the scheme 
for the broader Latin American region. The results cast doubt on how 
beneficial the scheme has been on combatting country-level corruption. 
In the vast majority of cases, participation in the scheme either had no 
statistically significant effect or even coincided with marginally 
increased corruption levels (with some exceptions, as in the case of 
Trinidad and Tobago where corruption across public officials declined 
marginally once the country became a candidate member). 
The EITI scheme aims to increase transparency primarily in the 
extractive sector; this is likely to constraint the ability of the scheme to 
tackle corruption in other fields (although one can argue of the possi-
bility of spillover effects). As a result of this, it is naturally impossible to 
attribute changes in corruption indices exclusively to participation in 
the EITI scheme (although the association is likely to be stronger for 
countries with economies that are largely dependent on minerals). As 
mentioned in the literature (e.g. see Kasekende et al., 2016; Lujala et al., 
2017 and Ogë, 2016) complementary measures need to be in place to 
ensure that the EITI has an effective anti-corruption effect (i.e. measures 
that facilitate the reporting of corruption acts and allow for a more 
meaningful and effective participation of the civil society). 
Our study is a first attempt at evaluating systematically the EITI- 
corruption nexus in the Latin-American context. Several studies in the 
literature, as well as the EITI secretariat, influential policymakers and 
NGOs, emphasise that the institutional benefits of the scheme can extend 
and trickle down to multiple sectors. Contrary to such expectations, our 
results offer a sobering prospect with respect to the potential of the EITI 
to lead to substantial improvements of institutional quality. 
The current process of expanding EITI to include beneficial owner-
ship, to provide more information at the sub-national level and to extend 
the reach of the scheme to environmental issues might enhance the 
scheme’s ability to deter corruption (and, more broadly, improve 
governance in the sector). Also, in the future, improved data coverage of 
sector-specific corruption (with an explicit focus on the extractive 
sector, as opposed to general national level indicators of corruption) 
would allow research to assess more accurately how the EITI initiative 
can affect institutional changes specific to the extractive sector. 
Furthermore, a more coarse global analysis (of all EITI members) can 
also be a worth-pursuing avenue for future research; the individual 
country estimates per year could be merged into a panel dataset with 
subsequent regression analysis estimating the overall average effect for 
the whole sample. 
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Appendix 1. Literature Review (EITI’s effect on institutional and economic variables)   
Authors Scale Dependent variable Effect Statistical 
significance 
Method 
Corrigan (2014) Global Economic development (GDP per capita) (− ) Yes Cross-country panel regressions 
Governance (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulation quality, rule of law, control of corruption) 
(− ) 






Panel data country fixed effects and Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regressions 
Etter (2012) Peru and Mali Corruption Peru (+) Mali 
(+) 
Peru: Yes Mali: 
No 
Balancing and synthetic control groups, country 
difference-in-difference 
Hoinathy and Janszky (2017) Chad Corruption Limited – Qualitative research with civil society groups 
Kasekende et al. (2016) Global Corruption (+) weak Yes Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) 
Malden (2017) Global Mineral investment climate (+) Yes Propensity Score Matching 
Öge (2016) Global Transparency (+) Yes Interrupted time series and panel data fixed effects 
analysis Corruption (− ) No 
Öge (2017) Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan 
Civil Society Organizations (− ) No Interrupted time-series analysis 
Papyrakis et al. (2017) World Corruption (− ) Yes Cross-country panel regressions 
Rule of Law (− ) 
Sovacool et al. (2016) 16 compliant 
countries 
Governance (accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, corruption)  
No Non-parametric test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) and 
regression analysis 
Economic development (foreign direct investment, GDP per capita) 
Sovacool and Andrews (2015) Azerbaijan and 
Liberia 
Corruption Azerbaijan (− ) 
Liberia (+) 
Non applicable Qualitative analysis (tendency line graphs) 
Government effectiveness Azerbaijan (− ) 
Liberia (− ) 
Fenton Villar and Papyrakis (2017) Zambia Corruption (− ) Yes Synthetic Control Method   
I. López-Cazar et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx
13
editing, Investigation. Lorenzo Pellegrini: Supervision, Formal anal-
ysis, Writing - review & editing, Investigation. 
Declaration of competing interest 
None.  
Appendix 2. Correlation Matrix (Institutional Outcome Indices)   
Control of Corruption Regime Corruption Public Sector Corruption 
Control of Corruption 1.000   
Regime Corruption 0.883 1.000  
Public Sector Corruption 0.882 0.931 1.000  
Appendix 3. Data Description  
Variable Name and Summary Statistics (mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum) 
Description Source 
Outcome Variables 
Regime corruption (0.508, 0.304, 0.006, 0.980) The extent to which political actors use political office for private or political gain. If focuses on specific set 
of actors – those who occupy political offices - and a set of corrupt acts that relate neopatrimonial rule 
(higher scores = more regime corruption). Scale 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) 
V-Dem 
(2019) 
Public sector corruption (0.506, 0.303, 0.004, 0.979) The extent to which public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other 
material inducements, and how often they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state 
resources for personal or family use (from less corrupt to more corrupt). Scale: 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) 
V-Dem 
(2019) 
Control of Corruption (0.114, 1.018, − 2.469, 1.868) It defines the exercise of public power for private gain. It includes additional payments to get things done, 
corruption on the business environment, “grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite 
forms to engage in “state 
capture”. Scale - 2.5 (less corrupt) to 2.5 (highest corruption). Indicator inverted for equivalence with the 
other indicators of corruption. 
WGI 
(2019) 
Predictor Economic Variables 
Log of GDP (24.239, 2.129, 18.880, 30.257) Log of GDP (current US$) WDI 
(2019) GDP growth (4.242, 5.095, − 52.428, 14.394) GDP growth (annual % change) 
Log of GDP per capita (8.242, 1.538, 5.196, 11.433) Log of GDP per capita (current US$) 
Trade (89.709, 51.899, 2.278, 392.886) Trade (% of GDP). Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross 
domestic product. 
Mineral rents(7.631, 12.948, 0, 56.694) Aggregate value of mineral rents, coal rents, gas rents, and oil rents (% of GDP) 
Predictor Social Variables 
Log of Population (15.991, 1.663, 11.357, 20.999) Log of total population WDI 
(2019) Birth rate (23.357, 11.598, 8.373, 51.107) Birth rate, crude (per 1000 people). Number of live births occurring during the year, per 1000 people 
Death rate (8.708, 3.345, 1.581, 17.877) Death rate, crude (per 1000 people). Number of deaths occurring during the year, per 1000 people 
Basic drinking water services (82.086, 20.266, 17.700, 
100) 
People using at least basic drinking water services (% of population). 
Basic sanitation services (69.336, 31.346, 4.906, 100) People using at least basic sanitation services (% of population) 
Access to electricity (74.502, 33.033, 1.371, 100) Access to electricity (% of population) 
Adolescent fertility rate (57.588, 47.099, 0.638, 209, 
188) 
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1000 women, ages 15–19) 
Life expectancy at birth, female (71.042, 10.047, 46, 
305, 85.865) 
Life expectancy at birth, female (years). The number of years a new-born infant would live if prevailing 
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth 
Life expectancy at birth, male (66.223, 9.001, 44.520, 
79.782) 
Life expectancy at birth, male (years). The number of years a new-born infant would live if prevailing 
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth. 
Mortality rate, infant (32.296, 28.217, 2.309, 119, 682) Mortality rate, infant (per 1000 live births). Number of deaths of infants under one year old per 1000 live 
births 
Labour force participation (62.129, 10.572, 40.999, 
87.701) 
Labour force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+) 
Unemployment (8.098, 5.967, 0.722, 34.032) Unemployment, total (% of total labor force). Share of the labor force that is without work but available for 
and seeking employment. 
Vulnerable employment (41.168, 28.620, 0.344, 
94.711) 
Vulnerable employment, total (% of total employment) 
Employment to population ratio, female 46.363, 
16.439, 10.607, 83.516) 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%). Proportion of a country’s population of female that is 
employed. 
Employment to population ratio, male (68.226, 10.354, 
44.192, 93.207) 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, male (%). Proportion of a country’s population of male that is 
employed. 
Female employers (1.675, 1.362, 0.037, 8.994) Employers, female (% of female employment). Female workers on their own account or with one or a few 
partners. 
Male employers (4.155, 2.929, 0.064, 18.351) Employers, male (% of male employment). Male workers on their own account or with one or a few partners. 
Predictor Governance and Transparency Variables  
Regulatory Quality (-0.093, 0.991, − 2.354, 1.882) It includes measures of the incidence of market unfriendly policies. Scale: − 2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) WGI 
(2019) Voice and Accountability 
(-0.161, 0.999, − 2.313, 1.801) 
It captures aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. Scale: − 2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
(-0.184, 0.949, − 2.926, 1.525) 
It measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilised or overthrown by 
possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. Scale: − 2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
Rule of Law (-0.156, 1.002, − 2.315, 1.956) 
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(continued ) 
Variable Name and Summary Statistics (mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum) 
Description Source 
It gauges the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include 
perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the 
enforceability of contracts. Scale: − 2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
Predictor Political Liberties Variables 
Freedom of expression (0.683, 0.270, 0.012, 0.991) The extent to which the government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to 
discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural 
expression. Scale: 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) 
V-Dem 
(2019) 
Civil liberties (0.696, 0.241, 0.125, 0.972) It measures the extent to which civil liberty are respected. Scale: 0 (lower) to 1 (higher) 
CSO repression (1.031, 1.399, − 3.729, 3.379) It captures the government attempt to repress civil society organizations. Scale: from least democratic 
“-3.73′′ to most democratic “3.38′′
Electoral democracy (0.533, 0.260, 0.021, 0.923) It measures to what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved—liberal, 
participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other. Scale: 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) 
Political civil liberties (0.704, 0.269, 0.012, 0.984) It includes freedom of association and freedom of expression, relevant for political competition and 
accountability. Scale: 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest)  
Appendix 4. Donor Pool Countries and Weights  
Treated country Colombia Guatemala Honduras 


















Algeria 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Angola 0 0 0.005 0 0.018 0 0 0 0 
Australia 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Bahrain 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Bangladesh 0 0 0.002 0 0.002 0 0.207 0.102 0 
Barbados 0.006 0 0.009 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Belarus 0 0 0.020 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Benin 0 0 0.020 0 0.004 0.168 0 0 0 
Bhutan 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia 0 0 0.007 0 0.009 0 0 0 0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Botswana 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 0 0.004 0.029 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Burundi 0 0.044 0.003 0 0.045 0.012 0 0.004 0 
Cabo Verde 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Cambodia 0 0 0.005 0 0.008 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Comoros 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0.017 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Croatia 0 0.213 0.005 0 0.001 0 0 0.037 0 
Cuba 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0.220 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 0.009 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 0 0.004 0 0.006 0 0 0 0.380 
El Salvador 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0.005 0 0.053 0 0 0.197 0 
Eritrea 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Eswatini 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Fiji 0.135 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Gabon 0 0 0.006 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 
Gambia, The 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0.024 0.14 0.004 0 0.100 0.105 0.187 0.005 0 
Greece 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0.003 0 0.009 0.693 0 0.156 0.040 
Haiti 0 0 0.004 0.050 0.011 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Iceland 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
India 0 0 0.008 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0.118 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Israel 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
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(continued ) 
Treated country Colombia Guatemala Honduras 


















Italy 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Jamaica 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Japan 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Jordan 0.124 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Korea, Rep. 0 0.012 0.007 0 0.004 0 0 0 0 
Kuwait 0 0 0.009 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Lao PDR 0 0 0.006 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 0.116 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Lebanon 0 0 0.009 0.443 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Lesotho 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0.001 
Libya 0 0 0.017 n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0.332 
Lithuania 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0 0 0.011 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Maldives 0 0 0.006 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0.008 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Mauritius 0 0 0.009 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 0 0 0.109 0 0.003 0 0.032 0.142 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0.017 0 0.003 0 0 0 0.026 
Morocco 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Namibia 0 0 0.008 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Nepal 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 0 0.237 0.014 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
North Macedonia 0 0 0.015 0.062 0.023 0 0 0 0 
Oman 0 0 0.006 0.013 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan 0 0 0.002 0 0.029 0 0 0 0.015 
Panama 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Paraguay 0 0 0.006 0.207 0.002 0.022 0 0 0.072 
Poland 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Qatar 0 0 0.007 0.039 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0.031 
Russian Federation 0 0 0.009 0 0.003 0 0.126 0 0 
Rwanda 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Serbia 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Slovak Republic 0.007 0 0.008 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 0.254 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Sudan 0.010 0 0.012 0 0.006 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Syrian Arab Republic 0 0 0.004 0 0.004 0 0.089 0 0 
Thailand 0 0 0.007 0 0.017 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 0 0.114 0.002 0 0.003 0 0 0.052 0 
Turkey 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0.071 0 0.462 0 0 0.305 0.101 
Uganda 0 0 0.005 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0.006 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0.003 0 0.008 0 0 0 0.002 
Vanuatu 0.020 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela, RB 0.306 0 0.004 0 0.006 0 0.240 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
West Bank and Gaza 0 0 0.010 0.187 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Zimbabwe 0 0 0.006 0 0.006 0 0 0 0 
n/a corresponds to countries dropped because of lack of information in the pre-intervention period.   
Treated country Peru Trinidad and Tobago 
Donor Pool Control of Corr. Reg. Corr. Public Sector Corr. Control of Corr. Reg. Corr. Public Sector Corr. 
Algeria 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Angola 0.001 0.010 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Australia 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.053 
Austria 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.007 
Bahrain 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.004 
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(continued ) 
Treated country Peru Trinidad and Tobago 
Donor Pool Control of Corr. Reg. Corr. Public Sector Corr. Control of Corr. Reg. Corr. Public Sector Corr. 
Bangladesh 0 0.010 0.016 0.032 0.001 0.002 
Barbados 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.008 
Belarus 0.004 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.012 
Belgium 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.013 0.029 
Benin 0.003 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.004 
Bhutan 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.034 0.016 
Bolivia 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Botswana 0.194 0.009 0.008 0.108 0.002 0.005 
Brazil 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.004 
Bulgaria 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.006 
Burundi 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Cabo Verde 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.006 
Cambodia 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.119 0.001 0.003 
Canada 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.012 
Chile 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.012 
China 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Comoros 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Costa Rica 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.007 
Croatia 0.003 0.015 0.015 0.006 0.004 0.003 
Cuba 0.002 0.009 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Cyprus 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.006 
Czech Republic 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.079 0.005 
Denmark 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.147 0.065 
Ecuador 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.005 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.003 0.010 0.015 0.005 0.001 0.002 
El Salvador 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.013 0.003 
Equatorial Guinea n/a n/a n/a 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Eritrea 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Estonia 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.009 
Eswatini 0.003 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Fiji 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Finland 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.015 0.017 
France 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.016 
Gabon 0.003 0.010 0.012 0.021 0.001 0.003 
Gambia, The 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.001 0.003 
Georgia 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Greece 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Guinea-Bissau 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Haiti 0 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Hungary 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.008 
Iceland 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.01 0.047 
India 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.005 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Ireland 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.003 0 0.017 
Israel 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.007 
Italy n/a n/a n/a 0.002 0.025 0.005 
Jamaica 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.006 
Japan 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.026 
Jordan 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Kenya 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Korea, Rep. 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.124 0.002 0.009 
Kuwait 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.004 
Lao PDR 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Latvia 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.199 0.007 
Lebanon 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.101 0.002 0.003 
Lesotho n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.001 0.002 
Libya n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Lithuania 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.057 0.038 0.006 
Luxembourg 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.014 0.017 
Malaysia 0.003 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.004 
Maldives n/a n/a n/a 0.004 0.001 0.005 
Malta 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.006 
Mauritius 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.005 
Moldova 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Montenegro n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.001 0.013 
Morocco 0.002 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.003 
Namibia 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.005 
Nepal 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Netherlands 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.011 0.017 
New Zealand 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.037 0.045 
Nicaragua 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.003 
North Macedonia 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.008 
Oman n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.002 0.004 
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I. López-Cazar et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx
17
(continued ) 
Treated country Peru Trinidad and Tobago 
Donor Pool Control of Corr. Reg. Corr. Public Sector Corr. Control of Corr. Reg. Corr. Public Sector Corr. 
Pakistan 0.516 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Panama 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Paraguay 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Poland n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.004 0.006 
Portugal 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.007 
Qatar 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Romania n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.001 0.004 
Russian Federation 0.003 0.011 0.012 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Rwanda 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.005 
Saudi Arabia n/a n/a n/a 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Serbia 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Singapore 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.022 0.08 
Slovak Republic 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.005 
Slovenia 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.01 
South Africa 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Spain 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.018 0.02 
Sri Lanka 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Sudan 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.003 
Sweden 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.076 0.065 
Switzerland 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.029 0.026 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.002 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Thailand 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.083 0.001 0.003 
Tunisia 0.003 0.010 0.012 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Turkey 0.004 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Turkmenistan 0.001 0.011 0.013 0.005 0.001 0.003 
Uganda 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
United Arab Emirates 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Uruguay 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.021 0.008 
Uzbekistan 0.002 0.011 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Vanuatu 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.004 
Venezuela, RB 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Vietnam 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.003 
West Bank and Gaza 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.003 0.016 
Zimbabwe 0.002 0.010 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.003 
n/a corresponds to countries dropped because of lack of information in the pre-intervention period. 
Appendix 5. Results for Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras 
Colombia 
The extractive sector in Colombia (petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, nickel, gold, copper, emeralds) accounted for about 6.4% of GDP in 2017 
(WDI 2019). Extensive corruption in the management of royalties from the extractive industry is often associated with the inability of local communities to 
benefit from the sector (Arisi and González 2014). Given these concerns, the Colombian government signaled already in 2012 its intention to join the EITI 
(as a means to curb corruption); the interest in the scheme was largely seen as part of an overall government commitment towards transparency and good 
governance (also partly driven by its efforts to be admitted to the OECD; see Bebbington et al., 2017). Colombia officially expressed its commitment to the 
scheme in 2013 (during the 6th EITI Global Conference) and obtained candidate status a year later (EITI Colombia 2019). 
Figs. 7–9 depict values for the Control of Corruption, the Regime Corruption and Public Sector Corruption indices. There is no statistically significant 
deviation in the post-intervention period for the Control of Corruption (Fig. 7) and the Regime Corruption indices (Fig. 8). However, we observe larger (and 
statistically significant at the 1% level) values for Public Sector Corruption (Fig. 9) in comparison to the ones of the synthetic unit during the ‘commitment’ 
and ‘candidate’ stages (with a gap size close to 0.08 between 2013 and 2015). This coincides with the exposure of a series of corruption scandals since 
2013. In early 2014, a corruption network was uncovered with military officers receiving bribes in exchange for contracts, as well as appropriating funds 
meant for military supplies (BBC 2014). During the same time, several corruption scandals also surfaced involving multiple public companies (e.g. the 
national railway company Ferrovias, the ports authority Foncolpuertos, the Chivor water reservoir utility company etc), which is likely to have influenced 
public perceptions on public sector corruption (Warf 2019). 
EITI reporting and transparency 
Overall, the EITI documentation highlights minimal discrepancies between the financial flows reported by mining companies and the government; 
however, there seems to be a reduction in the share of the extractive sector captured by firms participating to the scheme, which was close to 95% in 
2013 (in terms of value of production, see EITI Colombia 2015) and fell below 90% in 2016 (EITI Colombia 2017). The informality of the gold mining 
sector appears (in all EITI documents) as particularly problematic (with more than 85% of small producers abstaining from reporting any data) and 
even seems to be on the rise in recent years (EITI Colombia 2018b). In addition, Ecopetrol, Colombia’s largest and largely government-owned pe-
troleum company, did not disclose all information regarding contracts at the beginning of the EITI scheme (EITI Colombia 2016) and fully complied 
only in 2016 (EITI Colombia 2018a). EITI reports also emphasise the need for better communication at the local level, where communities 
demonstrate extensive distrust towards extractive firms as well as public authorities (given the limited information on how mineral revenues become 
distributed and for what purposes, EITI Colombia 2016; 2018b); at the same time, the strong anti-extractives sentiments found in many local com-
munities also hinders the ability of the EITI to reach them and inform on any associated progress with respect to local resource governance (EITI 
Colombia 2018b). The 2018 EITI validation report (EITI Colombia 2018b) summarises the key factors limiting the effectiveness of the EITI scheme in 
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enhancing transparency: namely, the mistrust associated with the failure of the extractive sector to support local development as the initially booming 
extractive sector suffered from lower mineral prices and reduced foreign direct investment, the 2013 introduction of a more complex allocation system 
of mineral revenues to local governments (with many mineral-dependent regions losing out) and extensive doubts on the ability of public authorities 
in containing the expansion of illegal gold mining.     
Fig. 7. Control of corruption index of Colombia and adjusted P-Values.   
Fig. 8. Regime corruption index of Colombia and adjusted P-Values.   
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Fig. 9. Public sector corruption index of Colombia and adjusted P-Values.  
Guatemala 
In comparison to other Latin America EITI members, Guatemala’s economy is less dependent on the extractive sector, which accounted for 
approximately 2% of its GDP in 2017 (and about 13% of its foreign direct investment and 14% of its export revenues). Almost four fifths of royalties 
stem from the production of gold and silver (World Mining Congress 2019). Furthermore, Guatemala seems to suffer from higher levels of corruption 
compared to the other Latin American focus countries, e.g. with the Control of Corruption Index varying between 0.5 and 0.9 points since 2002, see 
Fig. 10). Large parts of the country are under the control of drug lords and crime syndicates; the inability of the government to take corrective action 
has led to public frustration and rioting in recent years. This culminated in 2015 when the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
and state prosecutors accused several politicians of creating a customs corruption ring to appropriate public revenues; violent demonstrations led to 
the resignation (and finally imprisonment after an anti-corruption investigation) of the then President Otto Pérez Molina (Warf and Stewart 2016). 
Guatemala officially expressed its commitment to the EITI scheme in 2010 and obtained candidate status a year later with support from the World 
Bank and the German Corporation for International Cooperation (EITI Colombia 2019). The country finally achieved compliance in 2014. 
Figs. 10–12 depict values for the Control of Corruption, the Regime Corruption and Public Sector Corruption indices. There is no statistically 
significant deviation in the post-intervention period for the Control of Corruption (Fig. 10) and the Public Corruption indices (Fig. 12). However, we 
observe larger (and statistically significant at the 10% level) values for Regime Corruption (Fig. 11) in comparison to the ones of the synthetic unit 
between 2013 and 2015 (i.e. during the later years of ‘candidature’ and ‘compliance’ stages, with a gap size close to 0.07). This coincides with a period 
of increased public dissatisfaction and rioting against mining concessions provided by the government. In 2013 local communities expressed serious 
concerns about the pollution stemming from mining activity and complained of receiving threats after expressing their discontent (Movimiento 
Mesoamericano contra el Modelo Extractivo Minero 2014). In addition, the political scandal of 2015 involving President Molina further heightened 
public perceptions of regime corruption (and increased distrust towards any scheme associated with his government, including the EITI). This general 
climate of mistrust towards government and politicians also deterred many civil society groups (especially those critical of the practices within the 
extractive sector) to get involved in EITI consultations (EITI Guatemala 2019). 
EITI reporting and transparency 
The EITI reports generally highlight problems associated with the functioning of the multi-stakeholder group (on the other hand, there appear to be 
only minor discrepancies between the financial flows reported by mining companies and the government). The EITI reports generally recommend that 
the multi-stakeholder group should broaden its focus and definition of transparency with a critical reflection on the environmental, social and 
educational aspects of the extractive industry, as well as identified irregularities in licensing processes (EITI Guatemala 2013a, b). It also criticises the 
limited participation of the civil society, which correspondingly limits the checks and balances envisaged within the EITI scheme (EITI Guatemala 
2013b). Many civil society groups have little trust in the government and the EITI and are, hence, very critical of other civil society organizations that 
decide to participate. To a large extent, the government is also to blame for this by dominating discussions within the multi-stakeholder group and 
treating non-government representatives as ‘guests’ rather than equal partners (EITI Guatemala 2013b). Several civil society groups and local 
communities have a deep mistrust towards the government and the extractive sector and largely perceive the EITI as a distraction from other more 
fundamental issues (environmental impacts, human rights issues, equitable distribution of rents etc, see EITI Guatemala 2013b). While participation of 
extractive firms has been consistently high (with participating firms accounting for more than 96% of value produced already since 2010, see EITI 
Guatemala 2013a), many small mining firms have not joined the scheme (although there were some temporary efforts in this direction during 
2012–2013, see EITI Guatemala, 2014). Before 2013, the vast majority of participating firms requested that only aggregate financial figures for the 
sector as a whole should be included in EITI reports (generating, hence, a sense of secrecy, see EITI Guatemala 2013b). Municipalities have also 
consistently failed to provide data on accrued rents (EITI Guatemala 2016). 
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Fig. 10. Control of corruption index of Guatemala and adjusted P-Values.  
Fig. 11. Regime corruption index of Guatemala and adjusted P-Values.  
Fig. 12. Public sector corruption index of Guatemala and adjusted P-Values.  
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Honduras 
Similar to Guatemala, Honduras is not particularly dependent on mining; extractive activity mainly consists of silver and gold production (which 
accounted for approximately 1% of GDP and 5% of export value in 2017, World Mining Congress 2019). However, informal mining is estimated to be 
three to four times larger in size, EITI Honduras (2019a). Corruption is rampant in Honduras (with the Control of Corruption Index varying between 
0.5 and 1, see Fig. 13). According to the Business Anti-Corruption Portal (2016), corruption in the form of patronage networks, bribery and clientelism 
largely impedes the development of an attractive business investment environment. Anti-corruption frameworks largely remain on paper and 
extortion is a common behaviour among police officers and tax officials. In procurement processes, bribery is commonly required to obtain contracts 
and licenses (Guardian 2015). 
Honduras officially expressed its commitment to the EITI scheme in 2012 motivated by its aspiration to attract foreign investment for its extractive 
industry. The country obtained candidate status a year later with support from the World Bank (EITI Honduras 2019a). Compliance has been deterred 
and delayed as a result of a number of flaws (identified in Honduras’ EITI reports) in relation to its EITI work plan, payments of royalties to subnational 
bodies and the active involvement of the public in EITI processes (EITI Honduras 2019a). Figs. 13–15 depict values for the Control of Corruption, the 
Regime Corruption and Public Sector Corruption indices. There is no statistically significant deviation in the post-intervention period for any of the 
corruption indices (and any deviations are of relatively small magnitude, e.g. close to 0.2 points for the Control of Corruption index). 
EITI reporting and transparency 
A recurring problem identified since the onset of EITI participation is the limited participation of small mining firms (initially only 6 large firms 
participated out of the 35 registered, which however accounted for the largest part of production value – i.e. close to 95%; EITI Honduras 2015, 2016, 
2017, 2018). Hydrocarbon and non-metallic mining firms only started participating after 2014 (EITI Honduras 2016). While this has been a good first 
attempt towards enhancing transparency in the sector by consolidating disaggregated data by the largest companies, little attention has been given to 
municipal-level information on revenue transfers and the utilisation of such funds (EITI Honduras 2017, 2018; 2019b). In addition, EITI reports 
emphasise the need for developing an efficient communication of EITI disclosures and findings to the wider public (EITI Honduras 2017; 2019b), as 
well as involving the subnational tax offices (EITI Honduras 2019b).
Fig. 13. Control of corruption index of Honduras and adjusted P-Values.  
Fig. 14. Regime corruption index of Honduras and adjusted P-Values. 
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Fig. 15. Public sector corruption index of Honduras and adjusted P-Values.  
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